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Abstract 
Sunk costs for R&D are an important determinant of the level of innovation in the economy. 
In this paper I recover them using a Markov equilibrium framework. The contribution is 
twofold. First, a model of industry dynamics which accounts for selection into R&D, capital 
accumulation and entry/exit is proposed. The industry state is summarized by an aggregate 
state with the advantage that it avoids the "curse of dimensionality". Second, the estimated 
sunk costs of R&D for the Portuguese moulds industry are shown to be important (3.4 million 
Euros). They become particularly relevant since the industry is mostly populated by small 
firms. Institutional changes in the early 1990s generated an increase in demand from 
European car makers and created the incentives for firms to pay the costs of investment. 
Trade-induced innovation reinforced the selection effect by which international trade leads to 
productivity growth. Finally, using the estimated parameters, simulations evaluate the effects 
of changes in market size, sunk costs and entry costs. 
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1 Introduction 
In this paper I document one effect of trade on innovation, by focusing on sunk costs of R&D. Reducing 
trade barriers allows firms to access larger markets. In the presence of sunk costs, this can give firms 
enough scale and create the right incentives for them to devote more resources towards Research and 
Development. Innovations can then generate future productivity growth, further increasing the gains from 
trade.1 I structurally estimate the size of the sunk costs for the Portuguese moulds industry after joining the 
EU in 1986. Using the estimated "deep" parameters I perform counterfactual policy changes in market size 
that illustrate this mechanism. If the market size was exogenously reduced to the beginning of the sample 
level, the model predicts a reduction in R&D performance, average productivity, capital stock and number 
of firms. A second contribution is the estimation of a dynamic game with many players. I hope this opens 
the avenue for an increase in the use of structural estimation methods with microdata to studies on industry 
dynamics. 
The data normally reveals large productivity and size differences between R&D and non R&D firms. 
Firms decide on R&D start-ups depending on the costs and benefits. However, these observed differences 
can be driven directly by R&D expenditures and/or selection into R&D, therefore leading to the question of 
which came first. This creates a problem for identifying the costs and benefits of R&D. To understand why, 
notice that large differences between R&D and non-R&D firms can signal large benefits for R&D 
(observed) and can be rationalized by the large costs of R&D. In this case R&D expenditures cause 
observed differences. Alternatively, observed differences can be due to a very strong selection effect into 
R&D, motivated by (heterogeneous) benefits being larger (or costs being lower) for firms with larger 
productivity and/or capital stocks. These two (and other) possibilities are observationally equivalent and 
therefore indistinguishable without closer inspection. Furthermore, it is most likely that both play a role. 
One way to address this question is by directly modelling these effects and using a structural model (that 
gives us the unobserved counterfactual) to estimate the costs and benefits. It is important to stress that the 
selection of larger and more productive firms into R&D is directly addressed in the model. 
In this paper the role of sunk costs of R&D is investigated as a main force driving the discrete 
decision to become an R&D firm. Estimating sunk costs of R&D is important because it will determine 
R&D performance and in particular the effects market size can have on industry innovation and 
productivity, topics of extreme relevance for policy makers. In the presence of sunk costs, market growth 
will trigger R&D start-ups. For most industries, only a fraction of the firms actually perform R&D. The 
reason must be that: either the returns from R&D are too low or; the costs involved (not necessarily sunk) 
are very high and prevent firms from engaging in R&D. The evidence suggests significant returns from 
R&D which gives support to the latter explanation. Recovering the dynamic cost parameters, gives the 
opportunity to perform counterfactual analysis on the impact of changes in the sunk costs to the amount of 
 
1Pavcnik (2002) estimates these gains for the Chilean industry and De Loecker (2007) for the Belgian textile 
industry.  
R&D expenditures and industry structure.2
The Portuguese moulds industry has been a heavy exporter since the beginning of its exis-
tence and grew substantially during the 1994-2003 period (almost three fold increase in total
sales). One of the reasons for this growth was the increase in demand from European car-makers
after Portugal joined the EEC in 1986. This can be seen by the decrease in the share of exports
going to the US (traditionally the larger market) in favor of Europe (mostly Germany, France
and Spain). During this period there was also an increase in R&D and innovation with the
strategy adopted by some players being to reinforce strong links with clients, develop new ma-
terials (product innovation) and minimize waste (process innovation). It has been documented
(Beira et al, 2003; IAPMEI, 2006) that the close cooperation with car makers was a strong
push towards the development of new processes and products. This type of "demand driven"
innovation is not uncommon in industries where products are non-standardized and there is
normally very close collaboration between supply and demand as in the case of moulds. There-
fore, due to the lack of a national market, access to large foreign clients was a strong driver
for the success of the Portuguese industry. The reason why car makers preferred Portuguese
moulds in the rst place was their recognized competence, technical skills and price competi-
tiveness. A report from the US international trade commission (USITC, 2002) emphasizes the
fast delivery, technology, quality and competitive price as the main strengths of the Portuguese
moulds industry. For example, CAD/CAM technology was rst introduced in the 1980s and
this was a requirement from car-makers in order to ensure compatibility of the design of moulds
(Beira and Menezes, 2003).
The contributions in this paper are twofold. First, a model of industry dynamics which
can be used empirically is proposed. This is done by assuming that rms individual states
are private information and that the industry state is summarized by a commonly observed
aggregate state. As a result there are two advantages for estimation: (i) it avoids the "curse of
dimensionality", typical in dynamic industry games and; (ii) it deals with unobserved rms in
the data, a problem that arises if one wants to estimate using equilibrium conditions. Second,
sunk costs of R&D are estimated for the Portuguese moulds industry and found to be large
(more than one year worth of sales for an R&D rm). This is done using the method developed
by Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2007), henceforth BBL, to estimate dynamic games.
Sunk costs become particularly relevant because this industry is populated by many small
rms. Institutional changes (joining the EEC in 1986 and the Single European Market in
2One hotly debated (and unsolved) issue is the link between competition and R&D performance. Aghion
et al. (2005) provide a theoretical explanation and some empirical evidence arguing that there is an inverted
U-shape relationship between the two, whereby innovation is higher for mid levels of competition but lower for
either very competitive or weakly competitive industries. Blundell, Gri¢ th and Van Reenen (1999), by contrast,
nd that the pre-innovation e¤ect dominates. However, since both market structure and R&D performance are
jointly determined in equilibrium, it is not easy to disentangle these e¤ects without a dynamic model that
addresses the market structure endogeneity issue.
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1993) caused an increase in demand from European car makers. Access to a large market gave
incentives for rms to invest in R&D and physical capital which later translated into increases
in labor productivity. This mechanism of trade-induced innovation (i.e., gaining access to large
markets makes it protable to sink money into R&D projects) seems to reinforce the selection
e¤ect by which international trade can lead to productivity growth.
Regarding unobserved players, most rm level datasets3 contain information on nancial
variables (balance sheets, prots and losses, number of workers) for a subset of the total pop-
ulation of rms in the industry. To estimate game theoretic type of models where players
strategies depend on the state of all competitors, requires observing all players in the indus-
try (if only the distribution of states is relevant, as happens when imposing symmetry and
anonymity (Doraszelski and Satterthwaite, 2007), only data for the distribution of states is
needed which can potentially be recovered from the sample). To see this, imagine that we want
to estimate a policy function as a function of the state of all (N) competitors in the industry,
(s1; :::sN ). If there is data on actions and individual states, this can easily be done non-
parametrically. However, if some players are not observed we immediately face a problem of
unobserved heterogeneity since some important variables are unobserved. So, either we control
for this unobserved heterogeneity in some way or we face problems in estimating the policy
functions.
Most studies in empirical Industrial Organization have then focused on oligopolies or regu-
lated industries where good information for all players in the market is available, but this leaves
aside a large number of industries which are relevant and interesting cases to study. In this
paper the proposed framework allows us to estimate a structural model without facing these
problems. Furthermore, for questions like the sunk costs of R&D, oligopolist markets are less
attractive since in most cases all rms are su¢ ciently large and the sunk cost of R&D might
not bind.
Aw, Roberts and Xu (2009) document a set of ndings regarding the interaction of R&D
and export status, namely the self selection into exporting and R&D of high productivity plants
and the impact of this in reinforcing their productivity advantage. They develop a single agent
framework where rms decide on entering the export market and doing R&D. Their model is
very similar in spirit to the one proposed here. The di¤erences are that on the one side it
allows endogenous entry decision into the export market, something that I do not model due
to problems with little variation in observed export status. On the other side, they do not
model capital accumulation or the dynamic industry equilibrium. The second is an important
disadvantage because it is hard to evaluate policy changes within a single agent framework.
3Examples of these are Standard & Poors COMPUSTAT for US rms, Bureau Van Dijks FAME (UK)
and AMADEUS (Europe) or Thomson Financials DATASTREAM (UK). Only census data would contain
observations for all rms present in the industry and even in this case smaller rms are sometimes sampled.
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The framework developed in this paper is a dynamic equilibrium model with productivity,
physical capital accumulation and entry and exit within a monopolistic competition setting.
There are both linear and quadratic costs with total irreversibility for physical capital invest-
ment. Productivity follows a rst order Markov process which depends on whether the rm is
an R&D performer or not. Finally, rms compete in the market where demand is modeled by
a representative consumer with constant elasticity of substitution utility.
The reason to introduce both (total factor) productivity and capital stock is to account for
two important characteristics behind rm and industry dynamics, size and productivity. In this
way, using total factor (as opposed to labor) productivity is important since labor productivity
is normally not scale free (i.e. rms with larger capital stocks have, ceteris paribus, higher labor
productivity).
One hypothesis that could explain observed behavior is unobserved heterogeneity in the
returns from (and costs of) R&D. In principle this could be relaxed by letting either benets or
costs depend on unobserved heterogeneity, but not both. However, this can only be done with
a su¢ ciently large time series so that rm xed e¤ects can be consistently estimated. Notice
however that part of the unobserved heterogeneity in returns is still accounted for by recovering
total factor productivity estimates via production function.
There are considerable costs of becoming an R&D rm that besides producing moulds, is
also able to supply its clients with conception and design skills, moulds testing and development
of new materials, all at a competitive price. A successful innovative rm is able to produce not
only the mould itself but also deliver all the pre and post production services required by their
clients. The costs of R&D we consider can range from the training and hiring of new employees,
investment in new machinery or even the establishment of links with universities and public
research agencies. These costs motivate the idea of sunkness.
Sunk costs have for a long time been regarded as one potential source of ine¢ ciency in
the economy. The earlier literature emphasizes the failure of the contestability theory in the
presence of sunk entry costs, which results in market failures because the industry will not be
competitive and rms can maintain some degree of market power (Baumol and Willig, 1981;
Stiglitz, 1987). The issue is of great importance for policy makers and regulators since their
existence results in a market failure which induces the need for policy intervention.
Sunk costs of R&D, in particular, have been widely studied in the industrial organization
literature, especially following the work by Sutton (1991, 1998). The main objective of this
research was to explore the relationship between R&D and market structure. In particular,
rms can use R&D as a strategic tool to increase barriers to entry and maintain a dominant
position even for large market size. One question raised by Schmalensee (1992) is how will the
incumbent maintain a dominant position, in the cases where R&D does not have a "forever
lasting" e¤ect and therefore does not create a "forever lasting" advantage/barrier. However,
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the study of more complex dynamics for the outcome of R&D requires a fully dynamic model
that goes beyond the two period approach and this type of framework was at the time in an
early development stage. Dixit (1988) acknowledges this in his work
"Perhaps the most important aspect ignored here is the possibility of partial progress
(state variables) in the R&D race. That has so far proved intractable at any rea-
sonably general level, but remains an important problem for future research". Dixit
(1988: 326)
As explained above, the incomplete information assumption whereby players only observe
an aggregate state addresses two problems both avoiding the "curse of dimensionality"4 by
reducing the dimensionality of the state space and dealing with unobserved rms in the data by
only requiring the aggregate industry state to be observed. Industry state can be summarized
by the (payo¤ relevant) aggregate state and the notion of equilibrium is then very intuitive.
Given the beliefs about the evolution of the aggregate state, agents behave optimally. Evolution
of the industry state resulting from agentsoptimal decisions is consistent with their (rational)
beliefs. Notice that restricting the strategies to be functions of the payo¤ relevant variables (in
our case the aggregate state) is common in the theoretical literature (Maskin and Tirole, 2001).
The main problem is to guarantee that the equilibrium transition for the aggregate state is
Markovian. In a sense this is close to macro-style models similar to Krusell and Smith (1998).
In related research Weintraub, Benkard and Van Roy (2008) propose the use of a di¤erent
equilibrium concept, the "Oblivious Equilibrium". In this type of equilibrium rms disregard
the current state of the industry and base their decisions solely upon the long-run industry
state. As the number of rms in the industry grows, this converges to the MPE provided the
industry state distribution satises a "light tail" condition. This result resembles Hopenhayn
(1992) and when the number of rms grows large, with no aggregate shocks, the equilibrium is
deterministic.
Introducing this form of incomplete information has some potential drawbacks by implicitly
restricting strategic interactions since rms now react to the "average" competitor (i.e. rm
As reaction to a market structure where both competitors B and C are very similar will be
the same as when B is very large and C is very small). How well this approximates actual
competition in the industry will vary from case to case. It is more likely that the assumption
is not valid in oligopolistic industries with large players where strategic interactions are very
important. In other industries, competition might be well summarized by the aggregate vari-
ables. Some good examples are industries where there is a large number of players, no market
4The "curse of dimensionality" is not only a computational problem but will also arise in the estimation. As
we will see ahead, since this industry state is very large, if one tries to estimate a exible policy function on
the whole state like proposed by Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2007), it will require a large amount of data (not
available on most rm level dataset). The best one can do then is estimate the policies for some aggregation of
the state space as implemented in Ryan (2006).
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leaders and products are di¤erentiated like, for instance, Industrial Machinery Manufacturing
or Metalworking Machinery Manufacturing (moulds, dies, machine tools). What these indus-
tries share in common is the fact that each rm sells specialized products, prices are contract
specic and information is not publicly available.
Earlier dynamic models only accounted for the e¤ects of entry and exit and did not allowed
for investment or R&D (Jovanovic, 1982; Hopenhayn, 1992). Ericson and Pakes (1995) develop
an attractive dynamic framework for modeling investment decisions where players use Markov-
ian strategies leading to a Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) as later dened in Maskin and
Tirole (2001).
However, solving the MPE brings with it two complications. One was the possibility of non-
existence of equilibrium in pure strategies, addressed by Doraszelski and Satterthwaite (2007)
with the introduction of privately observed independent and identically distributed shocks.
These shocks "smooth out" reaction functions reestablishing the existence of equilibria. The
second, is the "curse of dimensionality" and the computational burden attached to solving the
model. Recent algorithms (e.g. Pakes and McGuire, 2001) are successful in minimizing this
second problem and (depending on the size of the recursive class) can solve the model for up
to 20 rms, by using techniques borrowed from the articial intelligence literature. However,
they might not solve problems where there is a larger number of rms in the market. These are
exactly the kind of industries we might consider will adapt particularly well to the assumptions
introduced here.
Other theoretical models exist that study the R&D decisions in an equilibrium framework.
Vives (2004) for example, does this in a static setting, but it does not incorporate any hetero-
geneity, so that it cannot explain coexistence of R&D and non-R&D rms. Klette and Kortum
(2004) use a dynamic framework with the advantage of providing an analytical solution. How-
ever, the simplication that allows the elegance of an analytical solution is also the constraint
which prevents extensions to account for R&D sunk costs and aggregate uncertainty.
There has been a recent surge in the estimation of dynamic games5 after the development
of estimation methods (Aguirregabiria and Mira, 2007; Bajari Benkard and Levin, 2007; Pakes,
Ostrovsky and Berry, 2007; Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler, 2008). The method used is an
extension of Hotz et al. (1994) as proposed by Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2007) which allows
for both continuous and discrete actions.
Estimation is done in three steps. In the rst step productivity is recovered using production
function estimation methods. In the second step policy and transition functions are estimated.
By assumption, estimated policies are prot maximizing conditional on the equilibrium being
played, i.e. the equilibrium observed in the data. Continuation values are then estimated by
5A non-exhaustive list includes Aguirregabiria and Ho, 2009; Collard-Wexler, 2006; Hashmin and Van Biese-
broeck, 2008; Ryan, 2006; Santos, 2008; Santos and Van Reenen, 2008; Schmidt-Dengler, 2006; Varela-Irimia,
2008; Xu, 2008.
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simulating industry paths far enough in the future using the estimated policies and transitions.
Non-optimal policies are constructed by slightly perturbing the estimated policy functions and
simulating alternative (non-prot maximizing) continuation values. With these optimal and
non-optimal continuation values and exploring the property that the value function is linear in
the dynamic parameters, the dynamic parameters are estimated by imposing the equilibrium
condition, i.e., that optimal continuation values must be larger than non-optimal continuation
values. The linearity of the value function in the dynamic parameters greatly simplies the
problem since we do not need to recalculate (re-simulate) continuation values for each set of
parameters.
Finally, I evaluate the impact on investment, productivity and market structure of several
counterfactuals: a reduction in the sunk costs of R&D, an increase/decrease in market size to
assess the impact of trade opening and an increase in entry costs. The results show that a 10%
reduction in the sunk cost of R&D results in a 7% increase in average productivity and 50%
increase in average capital stock. Furthermore, a decrease in market size to the equivalent of
the early 1990s leads to a reduction both in R&D performance and productivity. An increase
in entry barriers has a negative e¤ect on exit by less productive rms while virtually no e¤ect
on R&D performance therefore leading to a reduction in average productivity.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the moulds industry,
section 3 gives an outline of the model, section 4 provides details of the application, section
5 describes the estimation, section 6 summarizes the data, section 7 contains the results and
section 8 the policy experiments, and nally, section 9 concludes.
2 The moulds industry
The Portuguese moulds industry is an interesting case of success. With an almost nonexistent
internal market, from its early years the industry developed by exporting almost all produc-
tion. Currently it exports 90% of its production and supplies 72% of its production to the
very competitive car manufacturing industry accounting for more than 1% of total Portuguese
Exports (CEFAMOL, 2008). The main advantage is the ability to produce complex moulds
which require advanced technology at a low cost and high quality (USITC, 2002).
"Despite Portugals small size, it has emerged as one of the worlds leading exporters
of industrial molds. In 2001, despite limited production of dies, Portugal was the
eighth largest producer of dies and molds in the world and it exports to more than
70 countries. The Portuguese TDM industrys success in exporting, and in adoption
of the latest computer technologies, has occurred despite the fact that Portugal has
a small industrial base on which the TDM industry can depend. Since joining the
EU in 1986, Portugal has focused on serving customers in the common
market." (USITC, 2002)
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The 1990s saw a strong sales expansion, mostly to the automotive industry. Over the
period 1994-2003 total sales and value added more than doubled (Table B.I). The reason was
that joining the EEC in 1986 opened the doors to the European market causing the increase
in exports mostly to France, Germany and Spain. This was later reinforced when the Single
European Market came into place in 1993 and by the opening of a large car manufacturing plant
(joint venture between Ford and VW) which became a large player in the economy. Tables B.II
and B.III illustrate the change in export destinations from 1985 to 1990 and the strong export
growth in France, Germany and Spain. The industry has stabilized since 2001 (CEFAMOL,
2008).
These changes gave a strong push in the demand for Portuguese mouldmakers and caused a
shift (as requested by clients) from the production of very simple to more complex moulds. To
achieve this, the development of competencies and technical skills that made the Portuguese
industry a regular supplier to big European car-makers like Renault, VW, Mercedes or Saab
was necessary.
It was the opening to EU countries (1986 joining the EEC and 1993 the Single Market) that
gave these rms su¢ cient size to introduce innovations which later translated into productivity
increases. Some rms used this surge in demand for their products as an opportunity to invest
and innovate. This allowed them to maintain and improve their reputation. At the same time,
labor productivity increased by roughly 40% over the period. However, this performance was
not homogenous across rms. As documented in Table B.IV, R&D rms export more, are on
average almost three times as large and 20% more productive (labor productivity).
The mechanism behind this change is interesting in itself because it is what can be called,
trade-induced innovation. In particular, in the presence of large costs of performing R&D, the
access to a larger market (EU) induced by favorable trade agreements, makes it more attractive
to incur these costs. There is also strong selection since larger and more productive rms are
more likely to develop R&D projects.
Another important industry characteristic is its fragmentation. The number of rms is very
large and there are no dominant rms (largest market share is below 10% in any given year).
This motivates the use of a monopolistic competition framework where strategic interactions
are negligible and the equilibrium e¤ects of entry, investment and pricing can be summarized
in the aggregate state.
Notice also that each mould is (quasi) unique, prices depend on the mould specication and
are typically contract specic, agreed between the producer and the client. Individual prices
are therefore, either unobserved or di¢ cult to compare due to product specicity. Firms tend
to specialize in a particular type of mould and therefore potential clients approach rms with
the expertise in their product. Portuguese mouldmakers mostly produce moulds for plastics
and rubber (very little production of dies or moulds for metal). Within each type of mould,
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the technology is su¢ ciently exible and allows producers to satisfy most needs (depending on
the technology they control).
Industry history The history of the industry dates back to the 1930s and 1940s when
the development of plastics created a great demand for plasticsmoulds. The Portuguese moulds
industry started to ll this need in the late 1950s as a major producer of moulds for the glass
(where it inherited some of its expertise) and especially for the toy manufacturing industry.
In the late 1980s the production started shifting from toy manufacturing towards the growing
industries of automobiles and packaging as can be seen by export composition (share of exports
by main client/product type) in Figure B.1. During the 1990s the biggest export markets
started shifting from the US towards France, Germany and Spain. (IAPMEI, 2006)
During this long period the industry su¤ered several changes both in terms of the number
of rms with a big increase in the early 1980s and a shift towards other main clients due to the
boom of the plastics and packaging sectors. This increased pressure for the introduction of new
technologies (e.g. CAD, CAM, Complex process, In-mould Assembling) and an increasingly
importance of innovation and R&D. For example, current computer operated machines for
building moulds use radically di¤erent techniques from the ones in the 1970s and 1980s. This
state of the art machinery allows exibility at a low cost alongside a close collaboration with the
client in the pre-mould construction phase, which is crucial for car-makers. The design teams
can work closely with the clientsengineers and produce 3D virtual versions of the mould which
are then programed into the machine to start production. This was in fact a major requirement
for car-manufacturers and one of the big advantages of these producers.
Given the industry structure, it is important to take into account the following facts that
will be directly addressed:
 High investment rates in physical capital;
 Large growth in sales and productivity;
 Existence of important aggregate industry wide shocks;
 Endogeneity of the R&D start-up decision (larger and more productive rms select to
R&D).
3 The aggregate state dynamic model
3.1 States and actions
This section describes the elements of the general model. Time is discrete and in every period,
t = 1; 2; :::;1, there are N rms in the market (Nt incumbents and Nt = N   Nt potential
entrants) where a rm is denoted by i 2 f1; :::; Ng
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States Agents are endowed with a continuous state sit 2 si6 and a vector of payo¤ shocks
'it 2 J both belonging to some compact set. Both the state and the payo¤ are privately
observed by the players. The econometrician observes the states, sit, but not the payo¤ shocks,
'it.
The industry state is st = (s1t; :::; sNt) 2 sNi . The vector of payo¤ shocks is independent and
identically distributed with distribution F' and can depend on the actions of the players. This
satises the conditional independence assumption and allows the value function to be written
as a function of the state variables which keeps the number of payo¤ relevant state variables
small (Rust, 1987).
Actions Incumbents choose l = lc + ld actions that can be continuous acit 2 Ac  Rl
c
or discrete (exit, R&D start-up) adit 2 f0; 1gl
d
and ait = facit; aditg 2 A  Rl
c  f0; 1gld .
For expositional purposes, throughout the rest of the analysis, discrete actions are restricted
to be binary and there is only one continuous variable (investment) and one discrete variable
(entry/exit). For example, if adit = 1 represents incumbency and rms decide to exit the industry
they set adit = 0 and collect a "scrap" value, e + '
scrap
i . Potential (short lived) entrants may
choose to pay a privately observed entry cost (ent+ 'entryi ) and enter the industry.
State transition
Assumption 3.1 (No spillovers) Conditional on current state and actions, own state evolves
with transition function
p(sit+1jsit; ait)
This assumption excludes the cases where the opponentsstates or actions directly a¤ect
(i.e. not through own actions) the evolution for the state. An example which violates this
is knowledge spillovers. This assumption is not necessary but it considerably simplies the
problem. In principle we could allow for p(sit+1jsit;at; st).
Per period payo¤ Time is discrete and rms collect per period returns which depend on
the state of the industry, current actions and shocks ((ait; st; 'it)) where the period returns
are assumed continuous and bounded.
Assumption 3.2 (a) There exists a function (S : sN ! S 2 R) that maps the vector of indi-
vidual states (st) into an aggregate index (S(s1t; s2t; :::; sNt)). This Aggregate State is observed
with noise (St = S(s1t; s2t; :::; sNt)+"t, where "t is independent and identically distributed with
cumulative function F" and bounded support).
(b) Per period returns can be written as
(ait; st; 'it) = (ait; sit; St; 'it)
6The model can be extended to discrete states. The focus in the continuous case is to keep notation simple
and easy to follow.
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Under this assumption, St is the payo¤ relevant variable commonly observed by all agents.
The random shock, "t, guarantees that there is no perfectly informative state St from which
agents could recover (s1t; :::; sNt) exactly.7 This is to prevent degeneracy of beliefs about the
current industry state g(stjSt; :::S0) (and the resulting equilibrium transition).
Note that the payo¤ relevant shocks ('it) do not enter the aggregate index (for example,
have no impact on the stage game pricing). One type of demand which meets this assumption
is the CES utility where the aggregate industry state is aggregate industry deated sales.
Assumption 3.3 (a) Individual states and actions are private information and;
(b) g(stjSt; :::; S0) = g(stjSt)
where g(stjSt) is the density function for the industry state, st, conditional on the aggregate
state St.
Assumption 3.3 states that the only common information is the aggregate state. Moreover
it implies that everything agents can learn about the state of the industry, st, is contained in St
and history (St 1; :::; S0) adds no more extra information. This is a fundamental assumption
to guarantee a Markovian aggregate state.
The timing is the following:
1. States (sit) and shocks ('it) are observed by rms;
2. Firms compete in the market and collect period returns ((:));
3. Actions (at = (a1t; :::; aNt)) are chosen simultaneously;
4. New state is formed (st+1; St+1; 't+1 2 sN S JN );
3.2 Strategies
The aggregate state For each state rms can take actions in some space ait 2 A. Players
are restricted to use Symmetric Markovian Pure Strategies.8 The strategies map the set of states
into the action space,  : s  S  J ! A (it(sit; St; 'it) = (cit(sit; St; 'it); dit(sit; St; 'it)))
where the action space is dened by A(sit; St; 'it)  sSJRl
cf0; 1gld . Using symmetry
we can drop the i subscript and imposing stationarity we can drop the t subscript:
it(sit; St; 'it) = (sit; St; 'it) (1)
7The intuition for this error term is the following, imagine sit is marginal cost which a¤ects pricing in the
stage game so that the price is a function of the state p(sit; St). If players make pricing mistakes, imagine the
actual price they set is p(sit; St) + "it, where "
i
t is independent and identically distributed, the aggregate state
(average price) is then St = 1Nt
NtX
i=1
p(sit; St) + "
i
t =
1
Nt
NtX
i=1
pit + "t, where "t = 1Nt
NtX
i=1
"it.
8Anonymity as dened in Ericson and Pakes is imposed by assuming that rms do not observe each others
state.
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Proposition 1 If players use strategies of the form [1], under assumptions 3.1 to 3.3 the
industry aggregate state conditional distribution takes the form q(St+1jSt).
Proof. See appendix.
So while the industry state is a vector st = (s1t; s2t; :::; sNt), St is a scalar variable that maps
all the industry state into an aggregate state St = S(s1t; s2t; :::; sNt) + "t. This result critically
depends on the validity of the Assumptions, in particular the restriction on learning in 3.3 (b).
As explained above this assumption can be tested and in the empirical section this is done by
directly evaluating whether the transition for the aggregate state is a rst-order Markov process
by testing the signicance of previous lags.
When some actions and states are not observed, the rm has to condition its strategies on the
expected actions and state of the competitors. When nothing is observed about the competitors,
the rm will have the same expectation about the state and actions for all competitors.
To understand the implications of this incomplete information assumption, recall that in
the Ericson and Pakes framework with the symmetry and anonymity assumption rms "keep
track" of the industry state distribution and not the whole industry state vector as would be
the case with no anonymity. This is because under anonymity, the industry state distribution
is a su¢ cient statistic for the industry state vector. In the proposed incomplete information
case what matters is just one moment of this same distribution so this imposes slightly stronger
conditions than the usual symmetry and anonymity. It implicitly imposes more structure in
the type of strategic interactions since rms now react to the "average" competitor (i.e., ceteris
paribus, rm As reaction to a market structure where both competitors B and C are very
similar will be the same as when B is very large and C is very small provided the aggregate
state is the same). Notice that it is implicitly assumed that rms are innitesimally small
with respect to the aggregate state and, knowledge about own state is considered to have no
impact on the evolution of the aggregate state conditional on knowing the current state so that
q(St+1jsit; St) = q(St+1jSt). If this was violated, at each point in time a rm would have own
individual beliefs about the evolution for the aggregate state. Although this can be allowed it
would signicantly complicate the structure of the game and remove most of the gains of using
the aggregate state model.
Corollary 2 In the case St =
PN
i=1 h(sit)+"t and under assumptions 3.1 to 3.3, as N becomes
large q(St+1jSt) is approximately normally distributed with conditional mean St+1jSt = (1  
s )S + 

sS and standard deviation 

St+1jSt = 

S(1   (s )2)1=2. Where S ; (S)2; s are
respectively the unconditional mean, variance and autocorrelation for the St process when players
use strategies [1].
Proof. We can write the distribution f(sit+1jSt) =
R
'
R
sit
p(sit+1jsit; (sit; St; 'it))g(dsitjSt)dF'
which is independent and identically distributed across i = 1; :::; N . The result then follows
from the central limit theorem.
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Corollary 3 As N becomes large, three moments of the aggregate state distribution, (S ; S ; S)
fully characterize q(St+1jSt).
Proof. Follows directly from Corollary 2.
3.3 Equilibrium
The equilibrium concept is Markov Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in the sense of Maskin and
Tirole (1988, 2001). Since strategies are restricted to be Markovian pure strategies the problem
can be represented as:
V (sit; St; 'it; q
) = sup
a2A
(sit; St; 'it; ait) + EfV (sit+1; St+1; 'it+1)jsit; St; ait; 'it; qg (2)
where
E [Vi;t+1jsit; St; 'it; ait] =
Z
s2s;S2S;'2J
Vi;t+1~q
(dsit+1; dSt+1; d'it+1jsit; St; 'it; ait)
~q(sit+1; St+1; 'it+1jsit; St; 'it; ait) = q(St+1jSt)p(sit+1jsit; ait)('it+1)
This value function depends on the beliefs about the transition of the aggregate state,
q(St+1jSt). These beliefs depend on the equilibrium strategies played by all players. Notice
that since rm i does not observe sjt;8j 6= i, it can only form an expectation of its rivalsactions
conditional on the information available. This has a similar e¤ect to the introduction of private
information in Doraszelski and Satterthwaite (2007) which smooths out the continuation value
and guarantees existence of equilibria (as if players used mixed strategies).9
Denition 4 A collection of Markovian strategies and beliefs (; q()) constitute a Markov
perfect equilibrium if:
(i) Conditional on beliefs about industry evolution (q) rmsstrategies (it= (sit; St; 'it; q)
maximize the value function V (sit; St; 'it; q).
(ii) The industry transition (q(St+1jSt;(sit; St; 'itjq)) resulting from optimal behavior
(it) dened above is consistent with beliefs q
(St+1jSt)
9Doraszelski and Satterthwaite (2007) have shown that in some cases the original Ericson and Pakes frame-
work did not have an equilibrium in pure strategies.
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The solution to the dynamic programming problem conditional on q is the optimal strategy
(:jq) and a solution exists, under Blackwells regularity conditions. These strategies will then
characterize the industry conditional distribution q(St+1jSt;) and the equilibrium is the
xed point to a mapping from the beliefs used to obtain the strategies onto this industry state
transition
(q)(St+1jSt) = q(St+1jSt;(:jq))
where rms follow optimal strategies (:). An equilibrium exists when there is a xed
point to the mapping (q) : Q! Q
A proof of existence for a similar class of models is provided in Doraszelski and Satterthwaite
(2007). The idea explored is that stochastic privately observed shocks "smooth" out reaction
functions guaranteeing continuity of own strategies on opponents actions. This ensures the
existence of at least one xed point (there can be many). For the interested reader in the
technical appendix I provide a sketch for the existence proof using Schauders xed point theo-
rem. I also discuss uniqueness which is not guaranteed but, there is some reason to believe the
problem becomes less severe in the aggregate state model.
3.4 Discussion
Reducing the industry state into an aggregate by introducing incomplete information avoids
the "curse of dimensionality". As noted before, this imposes more structure on the type of
strategic interactions by making policy functions identical to all industry structures that result
in the same aggregate state. In a sense this condition imposes slightly stronger restrictions
than the usual anonymity and symmetry assumptions which are also fundamental to reducing
the dimensionality of the state space. Symmetry and anonymity are a restriction that allows
the state space to be characterized more compactly as a set of "counting measures" (i.e. the
industry state distribution).10
Krusell and Smith (1998) explore a similar idea whereby the evolution of the aggregate
variables in the economy is well approximated by some summary statistics even in the presence
of substantial heterogeneity in the population.
Empirical methods like BBL can avoid equilibrium calculation and its computational burden.
However, they cannot avoid equilibrium calculations when producing counterfactuals. This is
one important reason for using structural econometrics models so that alternative policies can
be evaluated in the absence of good experimental data.
10Notice that the aggregate state is the payo¤ relevant variable and individual states are only informationally
relevant, i.e., to help forecasting what is the most likely aggregate state in the future.
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Assumptions 3.2 and 3.3 might be seen as restrictive in some settings.11 The rst is satised
by most reduced form prot functions whenever S is payo¤ relevant. For example, the model is
exible enough to allow di¤erent demand structures provided the aggregate state is the payo¤
relevant variable.
The second assumption is more restrictive as it requires that rms do not observe each others
states (and actions) and more importantly, that history of the aggregate state is irrelevant
conditional on the current state. Imagine the case where the state variable is price. It states
that rms observe industry aggregate prices (e.g. published by some entity) but they do not
observe individual prices for the competitors (e.g. this would involve prohibitive costs in market
research). For the moulds industry, each product is individual and therefore prices are product
specic. Furthermore, there are many rms in the industry and no signicant players. In this
sense, the assumption of incomplete information is not a severe restriction.
In industries where there are market leaders, Assumption 3.3 will not hold. A possible
extension in this case is to increase the state space to include the state of the market leaders
(notice this state is still only informationally relevant if the aggregate state is the payo¤ relevant
variable). There are now two dynamic problems to solve, one for the leader and one for all other
rms. State space increases to (sit; St; sLt) where sLt is the state of the leader. However, it is
still to be checked what the equilibrium resulting from players using these strategies looks like.
This is not a trivial extension of the work presented here.
Once equilibrium transition, q(St+1jSt), is known the problem can be represented as a
standard dynamic programming problem which can be estimated with available techniques for
single agent models (Rust (1987), Hotz and Miller (1993), Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002)) or
using estimators developed for dynamic games (Aguirregabiria and Mira, 2007; Bajari, Benkard
and Levin, 2007; Pakes, Ostrovsky and Berry, 2007; Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler, 2008).
4 Recovering the Sunk Costs
The framework is the following: rms sell di¤erentiated products and they can invest both in
physical capital and decide to engage in R&D for which they have to pay a sunk cost. These
sunk costs can range from building an R&D lab to the costs of internal reorganization or even
credit constraints. Finally, potential entrants can enter and incumbents can exit. The variables
and parametrization will now be dened.
4.1 State and action space
The state space sit for rm i at time t is represented by four variables: Physical capital (K),
productivity (!), R&D status (R; where R = 1 denotes that the rm has built the R&D lab
and R = 0 otherwise) and operating status (; where  = 1 denotes incumbency).
11Assumption 3.1 ("no spillover") is standard in the literature and it allows us to write down the transition
for the individual state conditional on the rmsactions independently of the other rmsaction/states.
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sit = (Kit; !it; Rit; it)
where !it 2 
; a compact set on the real line andKit 2 ; a compact set on the non-negative
reals. For the discrete decisions, Rit 2 f0; 1g; it 2 f0; 1g.
The aggregate state St is average deated industry sales ( ~Yt is average industry sales and
~Pt is the average industry price):
St =
~Yt
~Pt
There are also stochastic shocks (privately observed by the rm and unobserved by the
econometrician) including shocks to investment 'invit , to the sunk cost of R&D '
RD
it ; and to
the scrap value 'scrapit . The vector of payo¤ shocks 'it = ('
inv; 'RD; 'entry; 'scrap) is an
independent and identically distributed standard normal random variable.
After entering the industry, rms can invest in physical capital, pay a sunk cost and engage
in R&D and nally decide to exit from the industry. Denote the action space as a; where
a superscript denotes either a continuous decision (c) such as investment levels or a discrete
decision (d) such as starting an R&D lab or exiting the industry.
ait = (a
c
it; a
d
it) = (Iit; Rit+1; it+1)
Investment, Iit 2 I can take any non-negative value and the shape of the prot function
guarantees that this is always nite.
The law of motion for the state variables depends on the previous state and actions with
density function. This law of motion will be stochastic for productivity and deterministic for
all other state variables.
4.2 Parametrization
Using a demand and production function we can solve the static pricing game to get the reduced
form prots. This prot function satises Rusts (1987) conditional independence and additive
separability assumptions
(sit; St; ait; 'it) = ~(sit; St; ait) + 'it(ait)
4.2.1 Demand
Using the Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition framework in discrete varieties, there are Nt
available goods, each supplied by a di¤erent rm so there are Nt rms in the market. Consumers
choose quantities of each good Qi to consume at a price Pi.
Solving the representative consumer problem, rms demand is [see the technical appendix]
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Qit =
~Yt
~Pt

Pi
~Pt
 
(3)
Where the price index is ~Pt =
h
1
N
PNt
i=1 P
 ( 1)
it
i 1=( 1)
and

~Y
~P

=
1
N
PNt
i=1 PitQit
~P
is
average industry deated revenues. If the goods were perfect substitutes ( is innite), there
could be no variations in adjusted prices across rms, Pi = ~P and
~Y
~P
= Qi for all rms. Notice
that the representative consumer buys a fraction of each of the available goods. While this could
be relaxed using an alternative demand function, the benets of it would only arise if there was
individual price and quantity data available so that more exible elasticities of substitution
could be estimated.
4.2.2 Production function
The production technology is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas where L is labor input:
Qi = e
!iLli K
k
i (4)
4.2.3 Static pricing game
Firms compete in the market by setting prices simultaneously in a static demand framework.
Since in the short run the only exible input into production is labor and gross prots are
~ = [P (Qit)Qit   wLit] (w is the wage rate), the resulting solution to the short run static
pricing game is: 12
~(!it;Kit; St; ; k) =
1


   1


   1

l
w= ~P
l
S
=( 1)
t (e
!itKkit )
 (5)
where  = (   1)=(   l(   1)), ~ is gross prot and
St =
~Yt
~Pt
/
~Yt
1
N
P
j

!jtK
k
jt

Productivity Productivity evolves stochastically with a di¤erent transition for R&D and
non-R&D rms. In general, product and process innovation are di¢ cult to disentangle from
each other unless one observes rm level price data (e.g. Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson,
2008). Since the dataset for the moulds industry does not contain rm level price data, they
are considered to be indistinguishable in the model and productivity is broadly dened.13
12See derivation in the technical appendix.
13The model can however be extended to allow for quality in the demand specication (see Melitz, 2000).
This distinction would be important to model other type of phenomena like dynamic pricing, where for example
the e¤ects of product and process innovation would be qualitatively di¤erent.
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The internalsource of uncertainty distinguishes R&D investment from other decisions as
capital investment, labor hiring, entry and exit which have deterministic outcomes and where
the only source of uncertainty is externalto the company (e.g. due to the environment, to
competition, to demand, etc.). This distinction is important since the stochastic R&D outcome
will determine (together with entry and exit) the stochastic nature of the equilibrium.
Productivity is assumed to follow a controlled rst order Markov process.
!it+1 = E(!it+1j!it; Rit) + it
where vit is independently and identically distributed across rms and time.
4.2.4 Cost function
Investment cost Investment adjustment costs are quadratic (Hayashi 1982) and totally
irreversible with the following parametrization:
CK(It;Kit 1) =

1Iit + 2
I2it
Kit 1

+ 'IitIit if Iit > 0 (6)
where 2 > 0 indexes the degree of convexity and the priceof investment is 1+ '
I
it > 0:
R&D technology The rm has the choice of building an R&D lab at a sunk cost of +
'Rit where '
R
it is a standard normal random variable. As mentioned above the continuous R&D
decision of how much to spend each period is not directly modeled. This is done mainly for
simplicity since otherwise there would be an extra policy function to consider. The empirical
results from the literature suggest that R&D intensity (R&D to sales ratio) is highly autocor-
related. For example, Klette and Kortum (2004) take this as a stylized fact that they t with
their model. This simplication could lead to overestimating the sunk costs of R&D because
the estimates do not take into account the period by period expenditures and would therefore
overestimate the benets of R&D. The alternative followed in this paper is to estimate the
static prot function using observed prots and allow for a xed cost (or benet) for R&D
rms. In this way, any R&D costs which are not incorporated in physical capital would in
fact be accounted for (see equation 11). Furthermore, physical capital decisions are directly
modeled so that any physical capital costs incurred due to R&D period by period expenditure,
would "show up" in the policy function for investment. The same applies for R&D labor or
materials expenditures (for accounting reasons some R&D costs can show up as normal labor
or physical capital in the data). For these two reasons, abstracting from the continuous R&D
decision should not cause a severe bias in the estimate of the sunk costs.
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Entry cost Potential entrants, denoted by it = 0, are short lived and cannot delay
entry. Upon entry, rms must pay a (privately observed) sunk entry fee of Ent+ 'entryit to get
a draw of (!;K) with distribution p(!t+1;Kt+1jt = 0). Since entry e¤ects are captured in the
equilibrium transition for the aggregate state, entry does not need to be modeled for estimation
purposes. However, to produce counterfactuals, we need to recalculate equilibrium transitions
for the aggregate state and the entry process will then be explicitly modeled.
Exit value Every period the rm has the option of exiting the industry and collecting a
scrap exit value of e+ 'scrapit .
Payo¤ shocks The vector of payo¤ shocks ' = ('inv; 'RD; 'entry; 'scrap) are indepen-
dent and identically distributed standard normal.
4.2.5 State transition
As explained above productivity follows a controlled Markov process. The capital stock depre-
ciates at rate  and investment adds to the stock:
Ki;t+1 = (1  )Kit + Iit
If a rm decides to start R&D, the sunk cost is paid only once at start-up:
Ri;t+1 =
8<: 1 if Rit = 1 or rm pays sunk cost0 otherwise
If a rm exits it sets i;t+1 = 0 and if it enters it sets i;t+1 = 1
i;t+1 =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
1
if it = 0 and rm i enters OR,
it = 1 and rm i stays
0
if it = 0 and rm i does not enter OR,
it = 1 and rm i exits
4.2.6 Period Returns
Using the specied cost structure the per period return function of an incumbent is
(!it;Kit; Rit; Rit+1; it+1; Iit; St) =
=
8<: ~(!it;Kit; St)  1Iit   2
I2it
Kit 1
  'invit Iit
 (+ 'RDit )(Rit+1  Rit)Rit+1 + (1  it+1)(e+ 'scrapit )
9=;
The demand system specied in equation [3] illustrates the two aggregate variables which
a¤ect a companys revenues. One is market size ( ~Y ) which evolves exogenously and the other
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is average industry price ( ~P ) which is determined endogenously. Since individual prices are de-
termined in the static pricing game by productivity and physical capital (P i = P (!i;Ki; ~P ; ~Y ),
see the technical appendix), the price index is a mapping from individual rmsproductivity
and capital stock onto a pricing strategy so that the aggregate state variable is
St =
~Yt
~Pt(!;K;R; ~Y )
5 The estimation procedure
There are several alternatives to estimate dynamic games (see for example Pesendorfer and
Schmidt-Dengler, 2008; Aguirregabiria and Mira, 2007; Bajari, Benkard and Levin, 2007; and
Pakes, Ostrovsky and Berry, 2007). The method used in this paper follows Bajari, Benkard and
Levin (2007) since this allows for both discrete and continuous choices and is easily applicable
to the model outlined above. This estimation procedure has been applied by Ryan (2006) to
study the impact of environmental regulation changes on capacity investment for the cement
industry in the US. Ryan (2006) also considers Markovian strategies on individual states and an
aggregate state. Since he models an investment capacity game, the industry state is the sum of
competitorscapacities. The di¤erence from the framework proposed here is that industry state
aggregation is only used for estimation of the policy functions and not in calculating equilibrium
transitions, i.e. the equilibrium transition is still the individual state by state transition.
The estimation proceeds in three steps. In the rst step, unobserved productivity (!it) is
recovered by estimating a production function. A number of ways for estimating the production
function are considered (Olley and Pakes, 1996; Levinsohn and Petrin, 2002; Ackerberg et al,
2007, and Bond and Soderbom, 2005). The di¤erent methods give broadly similar estimates.14
The second step recovers the prot function (~(!it;Kit; Rit; St)), the rm-level and industry-
level state transitions, (p(!it+1j!it; Rit; it) and q(St+1jSt)) as well as the equilibrium policy
functions for investment, R&D and exit. Finally, in the third step, the dynamic parameters
(1; 2; ; e) are estimated using the equilibrium conditions.
5.1 Step 1: Productivity
Productivity is not directly observed and there are methods 15 to estimate it as the residual from
a production function (Olley and Pakes, 1996; Levinshon and Petrin, 2003; De Loecker, 2007).
De Loecker (2007) proposes an estimator for both the production function parameters and the
demand elasticity under imperfect competition when one uses deated sales instead of quantities
(see also Klette and Griliches, 1995). This method, however, cannot be directly applied to the
14See a companion paper (Santos, 2008) which compares several alternative production function methods to
recover productivity using the same dataset.
15Ackerberg et al. (2007) provide a survey on the literature for estimating production functions.
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model outlined above.16 The reason for this arises from the fact that input demand function
depends on the industry state, more precisely in our case, the aggregate industry state. To see
this, notice that for example investment functions depend on equilibrium beliefs about industry
evolution. Specifying the investment policy as originally proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996),
i(!), is a misspecication since the equilibrium policy for investment in an Ericson and Pakes
(1995) style game depends on the state of all players in the industry i(!1; ::; !N ).
Applying this to our case, elasticity of demand cannot be recovered in the rst step since
the input demand is also a function of aggregate sales.17 Taking the log of total sales and using
equations (3) and (4):
yit   ~pt = qit + pit   ~pt = 1

(~yt   ~pt) +    1

(!it + kkit + llit) (7)
Using materials to control for the unobservable as in Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), the input
demand is a function of the state at time t (individual and industry states)
mit = m(!it; kit; Rit; St) (8)
Assuming invertibility this can be expressed as18
!it = !(kit; Rit; St;mit) (9)
and the unobservable is now a function of observables. Note however that since productivity
is also a function of market conditions (St =
~Yt
~Pt
) in eq. (8), demand elasticity () cannot be
recovered in the rst stage, because it enters nonlinearly in the control function (9). This is the
main di¤erence from a single agent framework as in De Loecker (2007) where input demand
depends solely on individual state variables (mit = m(!it; kit; Rit)).
Using the controlled rst order Markov process assumption for productivity
!it = E[!itj!it 1; Rit 1] + it
where it is an independent and identically distributed random shock to productivity and
is assumed to be additively separable.
16This applies to most literature on production function methods following approaches similar to Olley and
Pakes (1996) which look at single agent problems and disregard the possibility that policy functions (investment
or materials) are equilibrium solutions to dynamic games. Therefore, the policy functions will be misspecied
and the productivity control function will not include some important industry level variables leading to bias in
the parameter estimates due to unobserved heterogeneity.
17There is also the selection problem due to exit as explained in Olley and Pakes (1996). In this paper I will
abstract from this problem since the number of exits observed in the data is very small and the correction does
not a¤ect my estimates. However, if there were more observations on exits, this problem could be more carefully
addressed.
18A slight concern with invertibility and imperfect competition is the fact that with imperfect competition
an increase in productivity might not lead to a direct increase in output and therefore in materials usage. For
the demand system specied, an increase in productivity is equivalent to a decrease in costs and it translates
directly into a decrease in prices (see the technical appendix). This means total output goes up and therefore
also does materials usage.
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Stage I From eq. (7) rewrite the production function using deated sales as variables ypit =
yit   ~pt and ~ypt = ~yt   ~pt = ln(St)
ypit =
   1

llit + (kit; Rit; ~y
p
t ;mit) + "
y
it
where "yit is measurement error in y
p
it and
(kit; Rit; ~y
p
t ;mit) =
1

~ypt +
   1

kkit +
   1

!(kit; Rit; ~y
p
t ;mit)
This can be estimated non-parametrically or using an nth-order polynomial approximation.
This provides estimates of \ 1 l and ^.
Stage II For the second stage use the estimated values to construct^it = y^
p
it  \ 1 llit and
with this get an estimate of  1 !it for a given
^ 1
 k and
e1

\   1

!it = ^it  
e1

~ypt  
^   1

kkit
Approximate non-parametrically E[!itj!it 1; Rit 1]. Several approximations are used in
the empirical section and in practice a cubic polynomial ts the data well for the productivity
transition without large unreasonable behavior at the tails of the observations19
y^pit  
\   1

llit =
1

~ypt +
   1

kkit + (10)
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10 + 
1
1

 ^it 1 + 1 ~ypt 1 +  1 kkit 1

+12

 ^it 1 + 1 ~ypt 1 +  1 kkit 1
2
+13

 ^it 1 + 1 ~ypt 1 +  1 kkit 1
3
377775 1 [Rit 1 = 1]
+it
Finally, use eq. (10) to estimate 1 and k by nonlinear least squares.
19 Instead of using a cubic polynomial, also reported are the results with a sigmoidal function which preserves
monotonicity: E(!itj!it 1) = 
0
0
(1+01 exp( !it 1))
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Robustness In the second stage, the error term in equation (10), it, must be uncorrelated
with kit and ~y
p
t . While this might be a reasonable assumption for kit due to the timing of
investment that makes kit independent from "news" at period t, the same is not necessarily
true for ~ypt if there is an aggregate time component t in the productivity shock it . One
potential instrument is the use of lagged ~ypt 1.
The potential multicollinearity problem between lit and (kit; Rit; ~y
p
t ;mit) as mentioned by
Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer (2006) is acknowledged by estimating the production function and
recovering the labor coe¢ cient in the second step. An alternative to address this multicollinear-
ity problem is to use the method proposed by Bond and Soderbom (2005).
Finally, there can be sample selection due to exit. The selection problem arises if smaller
rms are more likely to exit upon a negative shock generating a negative correlation between
productivity and capital stock for the rms which remain in the industry. This is likely to be
relevant in industries with severe exit behavior, but less likely to be true for industries with
little exit.
Most of these problems are addressed in a companion paper where several methods for
estimating production functions are compared using data for the moulds industry (Santos,
2008).
5.2 Step 2: Policies and transitions
5.2.1 Static Prots
There are two options to parametrize the prot function. First we can use the estimated para-
meters of the production function (l; k; ) and use the parametric form eq. (5). Alternatively,
since prots are reported in accounting data, we can directly estimate the parameters of the
prot function. Since reported accounting prots can be negative, this is only possible if there
are xed production costs. To model the existence of xed costs (which might depend on rm
size) we can specify the prot function as
~it = 

0 e
1!itK
2
it S
3
t + 

4 + 

5Kit + 

6Rit + it (11)
where it is measurement error in observed prots, ~it. This can be estimated by nonlinear
least squares.
5.2.2 Policies
Using the observations for all state variables (!;K; S;R), the policy functions can be easily
estimated. The investment function which results as the solution to the dynamic problem is
Iit =
1
22


@E(V (sit+1; St+1jsit; St))
@Iit
  1

  1
22
'invit (12)
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which can be estimated separately for R&D and non-R&D rms as
Iit = P
n;i(!it;Kit; St; Rit) + ~'
inv
it (13)
where Pn;i(:) is a nth-order polynomial. After trying with several polynomial degrees, the
evidence favors polynomials with smaller degrees because they produce policy functions which
are more robust at the tails of the observations. The reason is because even if higher order
polynomials produce a better t in the range of data with more observations, it might create
large distortions outside this interval of data by imposing highly nonlinear and unreasonable
functional forms, similar to Runges phenomenon. Since the intervals with less observations
are normally in the extremes (tails), this can create large distortions in the estimates at the
extremes which are points that can signicantly drive the average results. Since errors in the
policy functions enter nonlinearly in the second step, this can signicantly bias the estimates
in small samples. All results have been checked to avoid this by looking at the predictions from
the policy functions.
The R&D equation is estimated with a probit model where rms will decide to start doing
R&D if the costs (+'Rit) are smaller than the benets [E(Vit+1jRit+1 = 1) E(Vit+1jRit+1 =
0)] and the probability that the rm starts performing R&D is
Pr(Rit+1 = 1jRit = 0; sit; St) = (14)

0@ + 
24 EfV (sit+1; St+1)jRit+1 = 1g
 EfV (sit+1; St+1)jRit+1 = 0g
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since 'RDit is assumed to be a standard normal random variable. This can be approximated
by
Pr(Rit+1 = 1jRit = 0) = 
 
Pn;rd(!it;Kit; St; Rit = 0)

(15)
where again Pn;rd(:) is an nthorder polynomial (the same argument in favor of lower degree
polynomials is in place here).
The exit function can be treated in a similar fashion resulting in
Pr(it+1 = 0jit = 1) =  (Pn;(!it;Kit; St; Rit))
5.2.3 The transition function
Aggregate state From Corollary 3 the observed aggregate state has a conditional normal
distribution with mean St+1jSt = (1   S)S + SS and variance St+1jSt = S(1   2S)1=2.
Where (S ; S ; S) are respectively the unconditional mean, variance and autocorrelation for
the S process and are easily estimated using the sample moments. Alternatively, q(S0jS) can
be estimated non-parametrically.
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Productivity The transition for individual productivity is estimated separately for R&D and
non-R&D rms using a cubic polynomial on lagged productivity (gRD(!i;t 1); gNRD(!i;t 1)).
!i;t+1 = E(!i;t+1j!it; Rit) + it+1 (16)
= (!;R0 + 
!;R
1 !it 1 + 
!;R
2 !
2
it 1 + 
!;R
3 !
3
it 1)Rit
+(!;NR0 + 
!;NR
1 !it 1 + 
!;NR
2 !
2
it 1 + 
!;NR
3 !
3
it 1)(1 Rit) + it+1
Alternative functional forms (lower order polynomials) are also reported.
5.3 Step 3: Minimum distance estimator
Once the policy (investment, R&D and exit) and transition functions (productivity and aggre-
gate state) have been recovered, we can proceed as follows:
1. Starting from some state (sit; St) at t = 0, draw a random vector of payo¤ shocks 'it =
('invit ; '
RD
it ; '
scrap
it ); transition function shocks to productivity (it) and to the aggregate
state ("t). Use ns di¤erent starting values so that (sit; St) = [(s1;it; S1;t); :::; (sns;it; Sns;t)]
which can be equal to the states for each observation in the dataset;
2. Simulate actions (ait) by reading o¤ the estimated policy functions and using the payo¤
shocks;
3. Update states (sit+1; St+1) by reading o¤ the transition functions and using transition
shocks (it; "t);
4. Repeat 2-3 for several periods (each path simulated for T periods), and construct a
sequence of actions and states fait(si0; S0); sit(si0; S0); St(Si0)g Tt=1 from each of the ns
starting congurations;
5. Using the sequence of actions and states, compute the discounted stream of prots for a
given parameter vector :P T
t=0 
t(ait; sit; St; 'it; ~; ePn; );20
6. Repeat steps 1-5 nJ times to produce an average estimate at each of the ns states. This
gives an estimate of the expected value from a starting conguration, (sit; St)t=0:
dEV (si0; S0; ~; ) = 1
nJ
nJX
j=1
TX
t=0
t(ajit; s
j
it; S
j
t ; '
j
it; ~;
ePn; )
20The discount factor is set at  = 0:96.
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In order for a strategy, , to be an equilibrium, at equilibrium beliefs, q(:), for all 0 6= 
the following condition holds
V (si0; S0;; q
(St+1jSt); )  V (si0; S0;0; q(St+1jSt); )
Given the linearity of the value function in the dynamic parameters this can be written
as
V (si0; S0;; q
(St+1jSt); ) =W (si0; S0;; q(St+1jSt))  
where W (si0; S0;; q(St+1jSt)) = Ejsi0;S0
P1
s=0 
swis and  = [1; 1; 2; ; e], wis =e(sis; Ss; ); Iis; I2is; 1(Ris+1 = 1; Ris = 0); 1(is+1 = 0; is = 1);
7. Construct alternative investment, R&D and exit policies (0), for example, by drawing
a mean-zero normal error and adding it to the estimated second step policies. With
these non-optimal policies, construct alternative expected values following steps 1-6 to
get W (s0; S0;0; q(:)). Do this for n alternative policies;
8. Finally, compute the di¤erences between the optimal and non-optimal value functions for
several (Xk) policies and states (Xk; k = 1; :::nI), where Xk is a given pair of (0; si0; S0)
so that we have nI = n  ns of them;
g^(Xk; ; ~; ePn) = hW^ (si0; S0; ^; q^(St+1jSt))  W^ (si0; S0; ^0; q^(St+1jSt))i  
Since the estimated policies should be optimal, the expected value when using  cannot
be smaller than using alternative 0. The empirical minimum di¤erence estimator minimizes21
squared equilibrium condition violations, g(Xk; ; ~; ePn) < 0
J^(; ~) =
1
nI
nIX
k=1

min
n
g^(Xk; ; ~; ePn); 0o2
and
^ = argmin
2
1
nI
nIX
k=1

min
n
g(Xk; ; ~; ePn); 0o2
21When the objective functions lacks smoothness (e.g. problems with discontinuous, non-di¤erentiable, or sto-
chastic objective functions) using derivative based methods might produce inaccurate solutions. Using derivative
free methods (for example, Nelder-Mead) to minimize the empirical minimum distance (J^) helps to circumvent
these problems. Non-smoothness might occur with nite nI , because of the min operator in the empirical ob-
jective function, J^ , which takes only the negative values of g(:) and this creates discontinuities even if g() is
continuous in . All results are not a¤ected by the optimization method used.
These methods are known to be slow and sometimes innacurate. Speed is not a problem because the compu-
tational burden rests in the simulations and not in the optimization. To deal with possible innacuracy, an option
is to rescale the parameters so that they all lie within a small interval (e.g. [ 1; 1]) and restart the optimization
algorithm at di¤erent starting values to check the answer is correct.
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The time of each path is set at T = 75, the number of starting congurations ns = 1; 017
which is the total number of observations, the number of simulations for each conguration
nJ = 200 and the number of alternative policies n = 125, so that the total number of di¤erences
is nI = 127; 125.
A note on alternative policies and set identication The vector of dynamic para-
meters , must rationalize the observed strategy prole, . In general  can be point or set
identied depending on the model, data available and alternative policies. Bajari et al. (2007)
also propose a method for (bounds) set identication on .
The objective function, J(), depends on the alternative policies used, 0, so that this is a
crucial step for identication. The inequality in J() arises exactly from comparing  and 0.
If we use policies very "far" from , the identied set should increase and if we use policies very
"close" to , the identied set should shrink. Since we can produce as many alternative policies
as desired, the (set) identication of the model can be improved by articially generating non-
optimal data and wisely choosing the alternative policies. For this reason I will focus on the
point identied case. One particular issue to address is how 0 is constructed. One option is to
slightly perturb the estimated policy function by adding some error. If the error is one sided (for
example positive) this means that all perturbed actions will be larger. Then, the parameters
are likely to be only set identied (one sided set). For example, if perturbed R&D start-up
decisions are more frequent (i.e. only positive errors added to the optimal policy function), the
alternative policies will generate high levels of R&D behavior. Since these are much higher than
the ones actually observed in the data, the sunk costs of R&D which can be rationalized have
to be above a certain level (bounded below), otherwise rms in the data must have performed
more R&D. However, the sunk costs are not going to be bounded above because only positive
errors have been added. For this reason the choice of alternative policies has an impact on
identication so should be done carefully by adding, in this case, both positive and negative
errors to the estimated policies.
In the choice of 0 if the alternative policies are not binding (i.e. they are chosen to be
very loose meaning the distribution from which errors are draw has a very large standard
deviation) again the parameters are less likely to be point identied. As the "looseness" of the
alternative policies increases so should the identied set. However, if the alternative policies
are very tight (very close to the estimated ones with a very small standard deviation of the
errors for the alternative policies) it is going to be much harder to rationalize the observed
actions and we will have more violations of equilibrium behavior (i.e. observed actions that
cannot be rationalized by any given ). If the error in the estimated policies is large, this could
a¤ect identication since we might be creating a more serious bias in  by forcing a non-optimal
(estimated) strategy to be optimal. Again a careful choice of the standard deviation for the
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errors a¤ects identication. In the application below, these are set as standard normal errors
for investment and normal errors with mean zero and standard deviation 0:5 for R&D and
exit. These translate into the fact that 95% of the alternative policies for investment are in the
interval 200% from the optimal one.
5.3.1 Standard errors
Standard errors are estimated using sub-sampling or the bootstrap. An important remark is
that only simulation error is produced in step 3. This error disappears as nJ !1 for a given
set of alternative policies. In practice, since bootstrapping requires very intense computations,
the bootstrapped standard errors can overestimate actual standard deviations since they may
still contain some simulation error.
5.4 Identication
5.4.1 Technical
The identication problem in dynamic models is well known (Rust, 1994; Magnac and Thesmar,
2002; Pesendorfer and Schmidt Dengler, 2008; and Bajari et al., 2008). Assuming agents
optimal dynamic behavior, imposes no testable predictions. Without further restrictions, a
given reduced form (observed) model can be rationalized by more than one parametric form for
the structural model.
The structural objects to be identied are the period returns, distribution for the shocks,
state transition function and discount factor: ((ait; st; 'it); F ('it); p(sit+1jsit; ait); ). These
primitives are in general non-parametrically unidentied (Rust, 1994), i.e., there is an in-
nite amount of primitives that can rationalize observed decisions so that di¤erent models are
observationally equivalent. Magnac and Thesmar (2002) provide some conditions for the identi-
cation in single agent models that is extended to dynamic games by Pesendorfer and Schmidt
Dengler (2008). The solution for the unidentication result is to use exclusion restrictions (i.e.
state variables that do not enter period returns) and/or normalization of the period returns
for some outside alternative. Even in these cases the discount factor and distribution of costs
shocks are still non-parametrically unidentied unless further restrictions are introduced.
Alternative solutions are when returns are observed and the return function can be estimated
non-parametrically or to use parametric restrictions. In our case part of the return function
(e(:)) is identied in the second step because prots are observed. The evolution for the states
p(sit+1jsit; ait) is also estimated in the second step (assuming agents have rational expectations
this allows us to recover their beliefs which coincide with the actual evolution for the state
variables) while the distribution of cost shocks F ('it) is assumed to be normal and the discount
factor, , is set exogenously. The only object left to estimate is the cost function which is non-
parametrically identied. To understand why, notice that in the model the return function
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is (ait; sit; St; 'it) = e(sit; St)   C(sit; ait) + 'it(ait) . e(sit; St) is estimated using observed
data while the cost function takes the value zero when there is inaction (no investment and no
R&D start-up), C(sit; ait = 0) = 0. This satises the exclusion restriction and normalization
assumptions in Pesendorfer and Schmidt Dengler (2008).22
Notice two drawbacks. First the error distribution (F (')) has to be specied parametrically
and there cannot be serially correlated xed e¤ects. Second, these identication results are as-
ymptotic. However, in applied work, identication can sometimes be harmed by the availability
of data in nite samples. This can be due to the fact that there is no su¢ cient variation in the
data. In this case the parameters might be weakly identied.
5.4.2 Empirical
I will discuss now the particular features of the data that identify the parameters of interest
(cost function). The second step is probably the most important part of the estimation. It
recovers the prots that rms expect to earn at each state (gross of adjustment costs), how
they make their decisions and also how they expect states to evolve over time. All these objects
will play a decisive role in identifying the parameters of interest. These objects can be estimated
non-parametrically and identication of these functions depends on having enough variation in
the data (rank condition) and not having unobserved heterogeneity (model misspecication).
In our case part of the unobserved heterogeneity is productivity, which is recovered in the rst
step.
Once the second step is concluded, the estimated dynamic (cost) parameters rationalize
observed behavior (i.e. the parameters for which estimated policy functions, returns, and state
transition are optimal). The lack of an analytical solution for the optimality conditions, forces
us to use computational methods. I now describe how the process works and clarify that
identication does not depend on implausible features of the data. Take our main object of
interest, sunk costs of R&D. We know the size, productivity and the (rational) expectations
of the rms who decided to start doing R&D. We also know (recovered) the gross prots they
expect to earn from making these decisions. The estimated sunk costs compare the prots
earned by the rms at a given state that decided to do R&D with the prots of the rms
that decided not to do R&D. Had these costs been higher, we would have observed less R&D
and had these costs been lower, we would have observed more R&D. The identication of the
parameters is therefore very intuitive given the data and observed decisions.
Notice that the use of rationality here might be seen as imposing too much structure as
it is not guaranteed that rms form rational equilibrium beliefs. However, this would not be
needed if we knew how beliefs are formed. Imagine that rms did not have rational beliefs,
22Further restrictions given by economic theory can be used to guarantee identication like continuity and
monotonicity (Matzkin, 1994)
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but were instead using some ad-hoc (non micro-founded) forecasting method to construct their
expectations. Since the equilibrium transition is estimated from the observed data, one could
argue that the beliefs they were using would match what we (as econometricians) also observe.
This would be along the lines of a behavioral model.23
6 The data
The data is part of a database compiled by the Portuguese Central Bank ("Central de Bal-
anços"). Observations are for the period between 1994-2003 for the ve-digit NACE (rev
1.1) industry, 29563. This database collects, nancial information (balance sheet and P&L)
together with other variables like number of workers, occupation of workers (5 levels), total
exports, R&D, founding year and current operational status (e.g. operating, bankrupt, etc).
Industry aggregate variables for sales, number of rms, employment and value added come from
the Portuguese National Statistics O¢ ce (INE, 2007) and industry price data from IAPMEI
(2006). The detailed data appendix provides a thorough description of the dataset and variable
construction.
6.1 Descriptive statistics
The dataset contains 1,290 observations for 231 rms over the period 1994-2003. There are 265
observations with positive R&D that correspond to 59 rms and 49 R&D start-ups (dened
as the rst year of positive R&D expenditures reported). On average, an R&D rm reports
positive R&D for 2.5 consecutive years (Table B.V).
Due to the short nature of the panel, there are very few observations on entry and exit.
A further complication arises due to the way data has been collected. Since answering the
questionnaire is not compulsory, some rms might not be reported in the dataset but still be
active in the industry. This complicates the identication of exiting and entering rms since
they could have been operating in the market before rst appearing in the dataset. This problem
is addressed with two variables that help to identify entry and exit. For entry, rms report their
founding year so this is matched with the year the rm rst appeared in the sample and if this
is within a 2 year window, the rm is considered a new entrant (this is reported in Table B.V
under the column "entry"). Regarding exit, the central bank collects a variable that reports
the "status" of the rm. The problem with this variable is that some rms that might have
closed down are still reported as "active", so only a fraction of the total exits can be captured.
Using this methodology identies a total of 48 entries and 7 exits from the panel.
23An alternative recently explored in Aradillas-Lopez and Tamer (2009) is the use of rationalizability to derive
bounds on the parameters by using weaker concepts than full rationality. Fershtman and Pakes (2009) also have
some very interesting work on extending the rationality concept.
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Tables B.I and B.IV report summary statistics for the main variables. The average rm in
the sample sells goods worth 1.5 million Euros and employs 32 workers with an average labor
productivity of 20,381 Euros. Over the period 1994-2003, real sales have grown at an average
8.9% and labor productivity at 5.7%.
After a decline until 1998, the total number of rms in the industry has grown to a maximum
of 1,230 in 2003, employing 10,108 workers. The industry is populated by small and medium
rms and there are no market leaders. R&D performers are larger and older and their labour
productivity is on average 20% higher.
7 Results
As explained above, the estimation is performed in three steps. The rst step recovers an esti-
mate for productivity (TFP). In the second step the reduced form prots, the policy functions
for investment, R&D and exit are estimated as well as the transition functions for productivity
and the aggregate state (capital accumulation is deterministic). Finally in the third step the
dynamic parameters are recovered so that they rationalize these estimated objects. Since any
error or bias in the policies or transitions will be transmitted nonlinearly in the nal step,
the results are sensitive to the second step . For this reason several robustness checks were
performed in the second step, using alternative polynomials, di¤erent static prot functions or
productivity measures. Besides this, alternative specications for the dynamic cost parameters
are reported. Overall the evidence of relatively large sunk costs of R&D is quite robust.
7.1 First step
7.1.1 Productivity (production function)
Production function estimates are reported in Table I.24 . The estimated labor and capital
coe¢ cients are 0.51 and 0.4, respectively, while the estimated demand elasticity implies a price-
cost margin of 8%. These values are at a reasonable level and within the range of parameters
found in the literature for other industries. In columns (iii) and (iv) results are also reported for
a linear and a sigmoidal parametrization for productivity transition. The advantages of these
two specications is that they both preserve monotonicity. Overall the di¤erences are negligible
which gives us more condence that functional forms are not restrictive.
Results using alternative methods are also reported. In particular using a simple xed
e¤ects specication with time dummies (column (v)) does not perform well due to the fact
that productivity is serially correlated. Adding the control function E[!itj!it 1; Rit 1] to this
24The results are reported for value added (and not sales) production functions. The approach is identical
under the assumption that materials are a constant share of total sales. Since by denition Yit = V Ait +Mit,
if Mit = mYit then Yit = V Ait + mYit so that Yit = 1(1 m)V Ait.
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(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
Dependent Variable: log of value added vait
First stage 2nd stage 2nd stage 2nd stage Fixed E¤ects
(OLS) (NLLS) (NLLS) (NLLS)
Cubic Linear Sigmoidal Control
Approx. Approx. Approx. function
Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e.
l 0.47 0.04 0.69 0.04 0.52 0.04
k 0.37 0.02 0.41 0.03 0.38 0.02 0.37 0.03
 0.08 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.04
00 42.45 33.63 -0.10 0.31 4.32 0.18
01 -20.93 16.77 1.02 0.06 300.39 191.51
02 3.76 2.84 4.09 0.09
03 -0.21 0.16 270.20 169.97
10 7.76 3.59 0.33 0.13
11 -3.17 1.70 0.94 0.02
12 0.75 0.28
13 -0.04 0.02
const. 3.57 0.64
R2 98% 92% 92% 92% 92% 93%
Year dummies
Obs 1,271 1,044 1,044 1,044 1,271 1271
Firms 227 223 223 223 227 227
Labor coef, 0.51 0.51 0.74 0.69
Capital coef. 0.40 0.44 0.40 0.37 -
PC Margin 8% 7% 7% - -
Notes: Column (i) reports the results for the rst stage of the production function estimates.
Columns (ii) to (iv) present the second stage estimates using a cubic, linear and sigmoidal
approximation, respectively. Results in column (v) are for a simple xed e¤ects specication
with year dummies and nally column (vi) is identical to column (i) added for xed e¤ects.
Table I: Production function estimates.
specication (column (vi)), reduces the magnitude of the labor coe¢ cient which suggests that
xed e¤ects and time dummies are not properly capturing the correlation between labor and
productivity.
Firms are willing to pay a sunk cost for R&D, if they expect a gain (higher productivity) in
the future. In Figure 1 the productivity distribution for R&D and no-R&D rms is reported.
There is evidence that R&D rms have better productivity draws and TFP is on average 26%
larger.
Finally, notice that results for the dynamic parameters in step three should be sensitive to
these productivity estimates. To resolve this issue several alternatives are used. The important
feature which a¤ects nal estimates is the higher productivity for R&D rms and this is quite
robust across all specications.
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Figure 1: Productivity distribution (cubic, linear and sigmoidal approximation)
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
Dependent Variable: Operational prots ~it
Cubic Cubic Cubic Cubic Linear Sigmoidal
approx. approx. approx. approx. approx. approx.
Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e.
1 0.42 0.17 0.43 0.17 1.15 0.05 1.14 0.05 0.40 0.17 0.42 0.17
2 0.88 0.05 0.88 0.05 0.71 0.02 0.70 0.02 0.90 0.04 0.88 0.05
3 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03
0 -1.63 1.12 -1.71 1.14 -4.80 0.83 -4.72 0.85 -1.55 1.14 -1.63 1.12
4 * -10.7 14.6 -7.6 14.5 -10.5 14.6 -10.7 14.6
6 * 111.8 25.3 110.9 25.3 126.7 25.0 127.3 25.1 112.1 25.4 111.8 25.3
5 -0.59 0.37 -0.58 0.37 -0.63 0.41 -0.59 0.37
R2 85% 87% 87% 85% 84% 84%
Notes: Results for the reduced form prot function using di¤erent specications and alternative
productivity estimates. *The coe¢ cients 4 and 

6 are scaled down by a factor of 1000.
Table II: Reduced form prot function estimates.
7.2 Second step
7.2.1 Static prots
Using reported prots (cash ow) the reduced form prot function (gross of adjustment costs)
in equation (11) can be estimated. On average, rms report 366,146 Euros in prots (with a
range from negative 740,000 to more than 14 million Euros). Fixed operating costs seem to be
important and increasing for rms with larger capital stocks since both ^4 and ^

5 are negative.
R&D rms are estimated to earn on average 111,776 Euros more. All these results are robust
across all specications as reported in the remaining columns of Table II.
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7.2.2 Transition function
Aggregate state The aggregate state will be a normally distributed Markov process if the
assumptions of Corollary 3 are satised. This is useful since we are only required to estimate
three parameters: the mean, variance and autocorrelation. These are:
S = 13:18 S = 0:28 S = 0:79
However, since the aggregate state is average industry deated sales, it is not guaranteed
that it can be represented as the sum of independent and identically distributed conditional
variables. Alternatively, the transition function, q(St+1jSt) can be estimated. Results using a
polynomial approximation are reported in Table III.
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Dependent Variable: Aggregate State ln(S)
Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e.
ln(St 1) 0.54 0.14 0.39 0.30 16.11 14.54 1592.84 1049.42
ln(St 2) -0.11 0.21
ln(St 1)2 -0.60 0.56 -121.61 80.54
ln(St 1)3 3.09 2.06
Constant 6.15 1.87 9.52 2.53 -95.03 94.51 -6940.60 4556.67
Observations 11 10 11 11
Adjusted R2 62% 25% 66% 75%
Mean ln(S) 13.18
St. Dev ln(S) 0.28
Autocorrelation ln(S) 0.79
Notes: Column (i) species a linear rst order Markov process and column (ii) a second order
Markov process. Columns (iii) and (iv) present results for a second and third degree polynomial.
Table III: Aggregate state transition estimates.
Specication test A test which rejects the results from Proposition 1, would cast doubts
on the aggregate state model. In particular, rejection of a Markovian aggregate state would
raise concerns about using an aggregate state model to represent industry dynamics. The
problem arises because, even by restricting players to use Markovian strategies (dependent on
payo¤ relevant variables), the resulting equilibrium evolution for the aggregate state might not
be Markovian.25
p(St+1jSt; St 1; :::S0) 6= p(St+1jSt)
The violation of Assumption 3.3 could lead to a history dependent evolution for the aggregate
state. Results in column (ii) of Table III do not reject the aggregate state model.26
25 In general, an agggregate state which is a collection of several independent Markovian variables of order
one, will not be Markovian of order one in itself.
26 I have also tested the signicance of distribution moments for the state variables (!it; kit) conditional on
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Productivity Using the productivity estimates from step one, we estimate the transition
function in eq. (16), separately for R&D and non R&D rms. Again, other parametric speci-
cations are reported. The use of a cubic polynomial ts the data well (Table IV). R&D rms
have a smaller productivity dispersion.
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
Non-RD RD Non-RD RD Non-RD RD
Dependent Variable: Productivity [!t]
Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e.
[!t 1] -2.80 0.98 -8.12 4.65 0.92 0.02 0.93 0.02
[!t 1]2 0.61 0.17 1.39 0.74
[!t 1]3 -0.03 0.01 -0.07 0.04
const. 7.97 1.87 19.94 9.66 0.46 0.09 0.46 0.10
[0] 7.04 0.03 7.43 0.03
[1] 64.65 1.80 90.32 2.75
R2 84% 93% 82% 92% - -
Obs. 790 254 790 254 790 254
Firms 197 59 197 59 197 59
s.e. resid. 0.18 0.09 0.18 0.10 0.23 0.13
Notes: Columns (i) and (ii) present results for the productivity transition using a 3rd degree
polynomial, columns (iii) and (iv) a linear specication and columns (v) and (vi) for the
sigmoidal approximation.
Table IV: Productivity transition estimates.
7.2.3 Investment, R&D and Exit policies
Lastly, estimates of the policy functions are needed for the third step where they will be used to
simulate optimal behavior. The results are reported for lower order polynomial approximations.
The choice against higher order polynomials is due to their weak performance in subsets of
the state space with little observations (particularly at the tails). The tted functions might
not preserve basic properties like monotonicity. This can generate very inaccurate predictions
for optimal actions, particularly at the tails of data distribution where there are very few
observations. Incorrect predicted actions at the extremes might generate very high/low returns
because they have a signicant impact on average estimates. As mentioned by Aguirregabiria
and Mira (2007), noise in the estimates is magnied in the third step due to the nonlinearity
in the minimum distance estimator.
The R&D (equation (15)) and exit policy functions were estimated using a probit model
whereas the investment policy function (equation (13)) was estimated by ordinary least squares.
For the exit policies a simple linear probit on the state variables is used because of data limi-
tations.
St. Their signicance would again reject the aggregate state model, i.e. it would test the hypothesis that
p(St+1jg(st); St) = p(St+1jSt). Results (not reported) show that further moments of the state variables are
not statistically signicant.
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(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
Dep. Var.: RD probit Investment Exit probit
RD rms Non-RD rms
Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e.
ln(St 1) -0.06 0.22 -0.18 0.16 -0.09 0.33 0.05 0.47
ln(Kt 1) 2.32 0.98 2.09 0.90 0.63 0.42 -2.71 1.66 -0.002 0.11
ln(Kt 1)2 -0.08 0.04 -0.07 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.13 0.06
[!t 1] -1.34 2.23 0.10 0.22 2.47 1.56 16.61 6.17 -0.50 0.32
[!t 1]2 0.12 0.19 -0.15 0.13 -1.27 0.48
Constant -13.32 7.97 -16.87 6.09 -4.85 4.88 -27.92 17.50 -0.21 6.33
R2 - - 40% 38% -
Observations 838 838 801 204 1044
Firms 212 212 208 51 223
Notes: Columns (i) and (ii) contain results for the RD start-up probit regression. Columns (iii) and (iv)
contain results for the invesment OLS results for the non-RD and RD rms. Finally column (v) contains
results for the exit probit regression. All results use productivity estimates with a cubic approximation.
Table V: Policy function estimates: RD, investment and exit.
The results are presented in Table V. The probability of doing R&D is increasing and
concave in capital stock which means that larger rms are more likely to pay the sunk cost
probably because they are also able to extract a larger benet from doing R&D. On the other
hand, it is only weakly increasing in productivity and there is no clear evidence that more
productive rms are more likely to start R&D (selection). It seems that the selection e¤ect
occurs non monotonically with rms at the extremes of the productivity distribution being
more likely to start R&D but this result is not statistically signicant.
Regarding investment decisions, larger rms or those with higher productivity tend to invest
more. This e¤ect is stronger for non R&D rms. Finally, larger and more productive rms are
less likely to exit but given the number of exits observed, these results are not statistically
signicant.
7.3 Third step
To estimate the dynamic parameters reported in Table VI (linear and quadratic investment
cost, R&D sunk cost and exit value), the third step implements the minimum distance estimator
outlined above. Standard errors were calculated using the bootstrap.
The values are estimated with the expected signs. Investment costs are increasing and
convex. The exit value is estimated at around 1.8 million Euros. However, given the very
small number of exits observed, this exit cost is very imprecise and not statistically signicant.
Finally for the parameter we are interested in, R&D sunk costs are estimated at about 3.4
million Euros which is almost 2 times the average rm level sales in the industry and more than
one year worth of sales for an average R&D rm.
Alternative specications where the quadratic investment cost term, 2, is dropped or a
xed operating cost, z, added are also reported. Overall, the precision of the linear cost for
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1 2  e F
Cubic approximation
Coefs -0.61 -5.82 -3,403,000 1,776,700 -
s.e. 0.87 3.02 1,254,081 3,490,173 -
Coefs -1.61 -4,010,500 759,500 -
s.e. 0.75 - 1,234,338 3,933,133 -
Coefs -1.62 -3,868,200 94,488,600 4,174,210
s.e. 0.77 - 1,598,430 137,614,269 6,195,137
Notes: Estimates for the dynamic parameters and bootstraped standard errors.
Table VI: Estimates for the dynamic parameters.
investment improves and it gives an estimated investment cost of 1.6 Euros for each euro of
investment, so that indirect investment costs for investment are around 60%.
A xed operating cost has been estimated in the prot function (4 ; 

5 ) as reported in
Table VI. Further introducing another xed operating cost automatically increases the exit
value, which is now unrealistically large. This illustrates the identication problems where the
two parameters are not separately identied because they are almost a combination of each
other. For example, if we assume no stochastic environment, a rm can decide to exit today
and collect the exit value e or stay one more period and exit tomorrow and collect + z^+ e^.
An indi¤erent rm will have  + z^ + e^ = e^. In the model with no xed cost (z), for an
indi¤erent rm we get  + e= e. Replacing and solving e^   e= 11  z^. This illustrates the
di¢ culty in separately identifying z^ and e^ because in this case there is no normalization for the
outside alternative.27 For this reason, estimating the xed operating cost in the rst step using
observed prots is clearly a preferred approach since it normalizes the prots for the outside
alternative (i.e. not exiting).
As explained above, bias in the policy function estimates will translate non-linearly into
the dynamic parametersestimates. Several alternative specications for the policy functions
using di¤erent degrees for the polynomials were tried. The estimated dynamic parameters are
relatively robust to these alternative polynomials. One issue not addressed here is the possibility
of unobserved state variables. This is a problem which can bias the estimates but the literature
with methods for properly addressing it is still at an early stage.
Using a simple "back of the envelope" calculation we can compare average prots of an
R&D rm in the period before it started doing R&D against average prots of an R&D rm
and this gives us a di¤erence of 230; 000 Euros. Discounting this di¤erence over a 40 year
horizon (imagine on average rms expect to live for 40 years) with a discount factor  = 0:96
gives a current discounted value of 4.6 million Euros which is slightly above our estimates. This
larger value comes from the fact that this rough measure does not account for selection into
R&D by larger or more productive rms and it also does not account for capital investment
27The estimated values of e^ = 94; 488; 600 and e = 1; 776; 700 with  = 0:96 rationalize a "net" value (i.e.
(1  )(e^  e) = 3; 708; 406) close to the xed cost estimate, z^ = 4; 174; 210. This illustrates the identication
problem since there will be an innite combination of pairs (z^; e^) which can rationalize observed decisions.
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after the R&D decision. Therefore, this value is in line with the estimates and reinforces the
credibility of our results.
Finally, these estimates are relatively robust to di¤erent approximations for the policy and
transition functions as well as the reduced form prot function. They are also relatively robust
to di¤erent discount factors, i.e. estimates for the sunk costs increase (decrease) with an increase
(decrease) in the discount factor within a sensible range (e.g.  2 [0:92; 0:98]).
8 Counterfactual Experiments
This section reports the results from three simple policy changes. The objective is to assess
their impact on industry R&D, productivity and investment. In the rst, sunk costs of R&D
are exogenously decreased by 10%, in the second market size is reduced to early 1990s levels
(from 405 to 150 million Euros) and nally entry costs are increased by 10%. The simplest
example of the rst policy could either be a direct R&D start-up subsidy or some more general
incentive like the creation of a public research agency dedicated to advising rms during R&D
start-ups or the supply of training for workers with very specic skills required to do R&D.
These are probably more e¤ective because some of the start-up sunk costs might be duplication
costs and a research agency would be able to explore the economies of scale. The second policy,
for example, illustrates the e¤ects of increasing trade barriers. The nal policy could be the
result of an argument whereby the development of su¢ ciently large rms should be supported
in order for these big rms to start doing R&D.
To simulate the e¤ects of these policies we are now required to solve the model. The new
equilibrium industry evolution, q(St+1jSt), has to be calculated. Some parameters have to be
set. These are the distribution for entry cost, total number of players, market size, discrete grid
for the state variables and the productivity distribution for entrants. The mean and variance for
the productivity distribution of entrants is matched with the actual value in the dataset (5.76
and 0.587 respectively). Total number of players is set at 1,000 and market size at 405 million
Euros. The grid used to discretize the state variables is similar to the distribution of the state
variables in the data.28 Finally, the mean and variance of entry costs is calibrated, so that we
get an equilibrium number of rms consistent with those observed in the data. Since estimated
exit values were negative and very poorly estimated, the exit value distribution is calibrated
jointly with the entry distribution to get sensible entry and exit rates of 5% per year.29
28For productivity (!): {4; 4.5; 5; 5.5; 5.75; 5.9; 6.05; 6.25; 6.5; 6.75; 6.9; 7.05; 7.2; 7.4; 7.75}
For capital (k): {5; 8.5; 9; 10; 10.5; 10.9; 11.2; 11.5; 11.8; 12; 12.2; 12.4; 12.6; 12.7; 12.8; 12.9; 13; 13.2; 13.4;
13.6; 13.8; 14.1; 14.4; 14.7; 15.25; 16.5}
For the aggregate state (S): {12; 12.15; 12.3;... 14.7; 14.85; 15}
29Both distributions are assumed normal. For the entry distribution the mean is set to 660,000 and the
standard deviation to 130,000. For the exit value distribution, the mean is set to -360,000 and the standard
deviation to 50,000.
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Original Policy Change
Data Simulated Sunk Cost Market Size Entry Cost
Average Sales (EUR) 529,665 680,171 768,042 581,636 696,345
Average Number of rms 681 601 654 280 535
% of RD rms 21% 22% 74% 14% 22%
Average Productivity 6.13 6.29 6.36 6.21 6.24
Average Capital Stock 351,512 383,310 577,001 303,246 414,033
Entry Rate - 5.36% 2.87% 9.30% 3.12%
Exit Rate - 5.31% 2.63% 9.23% 3.06%
Notes: Simulated results for the impact on market structure of a 10% reduction in RD sunk costs,
decrease in market size from 405 to 150 millions of euros and 10% increase in entry cost.
Table VII: Counterfactual results.
After setting these I use the algorithm provided in the technical appendix to calculate
the equilibrium for the model using the estimated structural parameters. Notice that these
experiments are only possible using the aggregate state model which is also relatively fast.30
Solving a full dynamic game would be computationally prohibitive.
Results are presented in Table VII. A 10% decrease in sunk costs leads to a strong increase
in R&D performance, a 7% increase in average productivity and 50% increase in average capital.
This means that by reducing sunk costs of R&D the average rms gets larger. Reducing market
size to the equivalent of the early 90s leads to a reduction in R&D performance from 22% to
14%. There is also a decrease in average productivity (8%) and capital stock (20%) which
illustrate the trade-induced innovation mechanism. Finally, the increase in entry costs has a
negative e¤ect on productivity (by reducing exit of less e¢ cient rms) while virtually no e¤ect
on R&D performance. This shows that while increasing entry costs could potentially be seen
as a positive measure in the presence of sunk costs, this would actually have negative e¤ects on
average productivity.
9 Conclusion
In this paper I have estimated the sunk costs of R&D for the Portuguese moulds industry using
a model, which is computationally tractable and, can be implemented empirically with the most
common type of rm level datasets. The model both avoids the "curse of dimensionality" and
the existence of unobserved rms in the data. The empirical ndings suggest a role for trade-
induced innovation. In the presence of sunk costs of R&D, access to large external markets might
create the necessary conditions for an industry to develop itself and become more competitive
by investing in R&D. This seems to be what happened in the Portuguese moulds industry after
the country joined the EEC in 1986.
30Solving the model takes about 150 minutes of computer time on a simple 2.0 Ghz Pentium Core2 Duo with
2GB Memory RAM.
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The idea explored to simplify the complex modelsdynamics, was to summarize the industry
state by the (payo¤ relevant) aggregate state. As explained, this implicitly imposes more
structure in terms of strategic interactions, i.e. the rms react symmetrically to all of its
competitors independently of its state (size, productivity, etc). This simplication does not
seem severe for the moulds manufacturing industry because each rm specializes in a particular
product, does not observe what its competitors o¤er, produces almost per piece and prices are
contract specic. We have reasons to accept that demand can be reasonably well approximated
with a constant elasticity of substitution framework. This simplication goes a long way in
allowing us to construct the counterfactuals and answer some signicant policy questions.
Finally, the sunk costs of R&D for the Portuguese moulds industry are recovered by using a
structural estimation method for microdata (BBL). These are estimated at around 3.4 million
Euros, more than one year worth of sales for an R&D rm. The magnitude of the sunk
costs suggest that policies cannot disregard the discreteness of the R&D decision. Particularly,
policies targeted at reducing the sunk costs and increasing R&D start-ups will be more e¤ective
at increasing overall industry productivity.
Using the aggregate state framework, we are able to solve the model and perform coun-
terfactual experiments. In particular, market size increase (similar to entering the EU) has a
positive e¤ect on R&D performance and productivity. Furthermore, a decrease in the sunk
costs of R&D will have a similar e¤ect while an increase in protectionism by increasing entry
costs, will have a negative e¤ect on productivity via selection (exit of less productive rms).
The existence of serially correlated unobservables and the extension to estimation techniques
which can be more e¢ cient but require equilibrium calculations (Rust, 1987) are important
concerns, left for future research.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of proposition 1
Proof. Using Assumptions 3.1 to 3.3, St is the payo¤ relevant variable and g(stjSt;:::S0) =
g(stjSt). Dene (i) the conditional industry state evolution resulting from assumption 3.1
and the Markovian strategies as p(st+1jst; St) = Ni=1
R
'it
p(sit+1jsit; (sit; St; 'it))dF'it (ii)
f(st+1jSt; :::; S0) as the industry state distribution conditional on the whole history for the
aggregate state. The distribution for the aggregate state conditional on the history is
f(St+1jSt; St 1; :::; S0) =
Z
"t+1
Z
st+1:St+1=S(st+1)+"t+1
f(dst+1jSt; :::; S0)dF"t+1
=
Z
"t+1
Z
st+1:St+1=S(st+1)+"t+1
Z
st
p(dst+1jst; St; :::; S0)g(dstjSt; :::; S0)dF"t+1
=
Z
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Z
st+1:St+1=S(st+1)+"t+1
Z
st
p(dst+1jst; St)g(dstjSt; :::; S0)dF"t+1
=
Z
"t+1
Z
st+1:St+1=S(st+1)+"t+1
Z
st
p(dst+1jst; St)g(dstjSt)dF"t+1
=
Z
"t+1
Z
st+1:St+1=S(st+1)+"t+1
f(dst+1jSt)dF"t+1
= q(St+1jSt)
where the rst step follows from using the law of total probability; the second step from the
denition of p(st+1jst; St) given above; the third step from 3.3; and the nal step again from
the law of total probability.
B Detailed Data Appendix
B.1 Data and sample construction
The data comes from three sources: Aggregate variables (sales, value added, employment) come
from the Portuguese National Statistics O¢ ce (INE); Industry price deators are collected from
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IAPMEI (2006); Finally rm level data was extracted from the Bank of Portugal database on
rms across the economy (Central de Balancos, 5 digit NACE code industry 29563 - moulds
industry).
Some notes on the "Central de Balancos": The dataset has been collected by the
Central Bank since 1986. However, due to changes in accounting rules, it is only comparable
from 1990. The quality of the data between 1990 and 1994 is not considered reliable. From
2000, the sampling method (simple random sampling) was changed to stratied sampling and
this caused a drop in the number of observed (mostly smaller) rms in 1999 and 2000.
Representativeness: The sample is representative of the whole industry, in particular
for the early periods. It covers 90% of total sales and industry employment in 1994 and this
coverage decreases to a minimum of 50% of sales (40% of employment) in 2003. This reduction
is mainly due to changes in the sampling procedure as explained above. There is an obvious gap
in productivity trends between the sample and the industry (also total sales and employment).
Labor productivity in the sample increased by roughly 60% while this was only 40% in the
industry. For this reason none of the aggregate variables are calculated using the sample but
come directly from the collected industry wide variables.
Variable construction:
- Capital stock was calculated using the perpetual inventory method with a 8% depreciation
rate
Kit+1 = (1  depreciation) Kit + Iit
- Value added is equal to sales subtracted from materials and external services expenditures
V Ait = Yit  Mit   ESEit
- R&D dummy variable takes a value equal to one whenever positive R&D was reported in
the past or present and zero otherwise.
Both aggregate and individual sales and value added were deated with the industry price
deator.
In 11 observations the number of workers reported was zero and these were dropped.
There were 9 holes identied in the sample, i.e. rms that interrupt reporting for 1 or more
consecutive years. In these cases either the earlier or later periods are dropped, minimizing the
total number of observations lost.
Entry and exit are di¢ cult to identify since it is not compulsory for rms to report to the
central bank. However, the dataset has information on the founding year and current rm
"status" (i.e. active, bankrupt, merged, etc). Using this information 48 actual entries and 7
exits were identied.
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B.1.1 Aggregate State
Market denition: The market is dened as total worldwide demand for Portuguese moulds.
This is mainly for simplicity reasons since there is no good data on worldwide production and
our dataset contains total industry sales (national plus exports). This adds the restriction that
rms in the Portuguese market take as exogenous the evolution of demand for their market.
Imagine that YW is world demand for moulds and Y = YW   Y NP is total demand for Por-
tuguese moulds. The assumption is that foreign competition is exogenous so that Y NP evolves
exogenously (YW , is assumed to evolve exogenously depending on the economic conditions,
etc).
Variable denition: The aggregate state is dened as average deated total industry sales,
which approximately matches the variable in the demand system: Y=NeP .
This can be divided into three variables. The rst is total industry sales (Y ) and can easily
be assumed to evolve exogenously. As explained above, this is total demand for Portuguese
moulds. The second variable is the industry price ( eP ) and is the solution to the static pricing
game. In the technical appendix the pricing strategies are shown to be a mapping from states
onto the pricing space. Therefore, this variable evolves endogenously. Finally, the total number
of incumbents (N) is also endogenous and it depends on market size. Modeling these three
variables separately would involve taking into account (and estimating) all cross correlations.
In Figure B.2 I plot the evolution of all variables. We can observe that the market was
growing mainly between 1993 and 2000 and pauses until 2003 and the number of rms share a
similar pattern. On the other side prices were increasing slightly over this period and decreased
in the later years. This characterizes most of what has already been explained before. The
industry grew substantially after 1994 due to the strong increase in demand for Portuguese
moulds. Together with this increase in demand we also observe an increase in labor productivity
and R&D. The cross correlations are as expected with prices being negatively correlated with
number of rms and market size, and the number of rms being positively correlated with
market size. The evolution of these three variables will be summarized by the evolution of
the single index variable, eYeP (average deated sales). This also helps to address potential non-
stationarity problems (see below).
Addressing non-stationarity issues: The industry grew substantially in the period 1994-
2003 so this raises concerns over non-stationarity. To analyze this we can look at the evolution
of average deated industry sales. The plot in Figure B.2 clearly shows that while it is true
that average sales were growing between 1994-1998, it seems to have stabilized over the later
period. The justication for this performance is the increase in the number of rms in the later
period (after 1998) as is evident in Table B.I.
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Number Production Exports Exports Total Value Added Price
of rms (EUR mio) (EUR mio) % Employment (EUR mio) (EUR/ton)
1994 644 171 132 77% 5,133 101 24.43
1995 570 193 151 78% 5,796 114 25.25
1996 452 244 191 78% 7,316 143 25.71
1997 477 293 220 75% 7,821 166 25.73
1998 461 322 232 72% 7,740 167 24.62
1999 549 362 250 69% 8,429 208 25.23
2000 604 412 277 67% 8,879 228 26.49
2001 612 421 328 78% 8,919 240 26.74
2002 722 378 310 82% 9,312 235 24.97
2003 738 403 303 75% 8,766 227 22.86
2004 1109 455 340 . 9,846 259 20.33
2005 1230 468 298 . 10,108 256 18.69
Source: National statistics o¢ ce, INE 2007
Table B.I: Aggregate variables
1970 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2003
1 USA USA USA USA USA France Germany
2 UK UK UK France France USA France
3 W. Germ. Sweden Russia Germany Germany Germany Spain
4 Canada Mexico Israel UK UK Spain USA
5 Venezuela W. Germ. Venezuela Netherlands Netherlands UK UK
6 Nd France France Spain Israel Sweden Sweden
7 Nd Netherlands Netherlands Sweden Belg./Lux. Netherlands Netherlands
8 Nd Venezuela Sweden Israel Sweden Israel Romania
9 Nd Spain Spain Belg./Lux. Brazil Belg./Lux. Switzer.
Source: CEFAMOL, 2008
Table B.II: Export ranking by destination country.
France Germany Spain USA UK Sweden Netherlands Belgium-Lux
1996 31,044 23,912 6,746 30,737 10,181 18,130 14,393 7,995
1997 30,416 31,462 8,740 33,714 21,333 19,179 11,771 7,561
1998 26,456 35,230 11,176 32,115 25,079 12,670 9,323 7,289
1999 45,767 36,314 23,172 37,876 17,058 9,760 9,103 9,210
2000 51,829 37,869 28,843 46,857 27,670 13,055 11,862 7,229
2001 71,222 53,863 35,659 36,687 25,133 10,979 12,940 8,444
2002 65,368 53,007 47,796 36,210 24,541 18,377 7,911 7,971
2003 61,633 66,837 39,909 44,102 16,177 15,364 6,527 6,527
2004 71,766 61,395 42,781 30,720 33,618 13,556 5,478 5,478
2005 68,221 47,233 40,399 20,074 16,615 11,586 9,275 9,275
Source: CEFAMOL, 2008
Table B.III: Exports to main destinations, thousands of euros.
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Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
All rms: 1274 observations
Sales (EUR) 1,574,073 2,869,201 3,292 34,700,000
Exports (EUR) 891,333 2,483,554 0 31,800,000
Capital Stock (EUR) 1,058,104 2,130,734 135 23,800,000
Employment 32 39 1 258
Labor Productivity (EUR) 20,381 9,044 359 74,632
Investment rate 0.20 0.25 0.00 5.32
Sales growth 8.9% 34.5% -195.8% 469.0%
Value added Growth 9.4% 40.5% -289.3% 477.0%
Labor Productivity growth 5.7% 37.1% -289.3% 284.3%
Non RD rms: 1009 observations
Sales (EUR) 1,198,854 2,321,233 3,292 26,800,000
Exports (EUR) 640,879 1,919,257 0 25,200,000
Capital Stock (EUR) 835,706 1,854,294 135 20,600,000
Employment 27 35 1 230
Labor Productivity (EUR) 19,609 9,178 359 74,632
Investment rate 20.9% 27.5% 0.0% 531.7%
Sales growth 9.9% 37.9% -195.8% 469.0%
Value added Growth 10.4% 45.2% -289.3% 477.0%
Labor Productivity growth 6.2% 41.1% -289.3% 284.3%
RD rms: 265 observations
Sales (EUR) 3,002,735 4,066,477 99,206 34,700,000
Exports (EUR) 1,844,947 3,811,178 0 31,800,000
Capital Stock (EUR) 1,904,897 2,802,605 53,161 23,800,000
Employment 52 45 3 258
Labor Productivity (EUR) 23,321 7,861 7,148 59,923
Investment rate 16.7% 14.2% 0.0% 77.5%
Sales growth 5.6% 20.1% -101.8% 123.3%
Value added Growth 6.3% 19.6% -113.3% 102.4%
Labor Productivity growth 3.9% 19.9% -87.2% 116.9%
RD to sales ratio 0.9% 3.4% 0.0% 46.5%
Source: "Central de Balanços", Bank of Portugal
Table B.IV: Summary statistics, by RD status.
Year Number Number of Number of RD start-ups Entry Entry in the Exits
of rms non-RD rms RD rms dataset
1994 144 134 10 - 2 3 0
1995 157 137 20 10 12 14 2
1996 165 141 24 4 8 14 0
1997 170 145 25 2 11 20 2
1998 164 135 29 7 9 33 0
1999 136 108 28 3 2 46 1
2000 92 68 24 7 2 8 0
2001 88 56 32 9 1 5 0
2002 88 53 35 4 1 2 0
2003 86 48 38 3 0 0 2
Total 1290 1025 265 49 48 145 7
Source: "Central de Balanços", Bank of Portugal
Table B.V: Descriptive statistics.
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Figure B.1: Sales composition, by client type
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Figure B.2: Aggregate State
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